

**Korean Security**  
**IRGN 490**  
**Spring Quarter 2008**  
**Stephan Haggard**

Tuesday and Thursday, 9:30-11:50, Room 1301

This course focuses on current security issues on the Korean peninsula, with particular attention to the current nuclear crisis. A distinctive feature of the approach is our focus on economic issues: the famine in North Korea, its aftermath, the strategy of engagement and the political economy of reform in the North. The course will be divided into four parts. The first will deal with a number of historical issues in the alliance relations of South and North Korea and will end with a close reading of the first nuclear crisis of 1992-94. The second section will consider the end of the Cold War order, and particularly the challenges North Korea experienced during the 1990s. The final two sections will address the current nuclear crisis in close detail; the first considers the main actors and their strategies; the final one some particular functional issues, such as strategies of engagement, the use of sanctions and possible institutional solutions.

There are two ways to fulfill the obligations of the class:

1. Memo option. Two short (1000 word) essays on readings of your choice (sign-up will take place the first day of class; 30% each) and in-class final (20%). Class participation will count for the final 20%.
2. Research option. One short (1000 word) essay on a reading of your choice (20%) and an individual research paper (10-15 pages) on a topic to be worked out with instructor (60%) to be presented briefly in one of the latter sessions of the course. I am particularly interested in papers that consider the question of economic engagement with North Korea and the evolution of North Korea's relations with China or South Korea. Class participation, 20%

I will hold office hours on Wednesday, 9-12 or by appointment at [shaggard@ucsd.edu](mailto:shaggard@ucsd.edu) or 534-5781.

There are several books that I recommend for purchase if you have an enduring interest in these issues; they can be gotten on Amazon marketplace at steep discounts. I will provide additional readings through First Class.

Don Oberdorfer, *The Two Koreas* (Basic Books, 1997).

Chae-jin Lee, *A Troubled Peace* (Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006).

## ***I. The Cold War System***

### **1. April 1. Overview and Introduction**

Recommended.

- Kathryn Weathersby, "New Findings on the Korean War, Translation and Commentary," and "Exchange Between Bruce Cumings and Kathryn Weathersby on Cold War Origins," Cold War International History Project Virtual Archive, at

[http://wwics.si.edu/index.cfm?topic\\_id=1409&fuseaction=library.document&id=426](http://wwics.si.edu/index.cfm?topic_id=1409&fuseaction=library.document&id=426) and  
[http://wwics.si.edu/index.cfm?topic\\_id=1409&fuseaction=library.document&id=226](http://wwics.si.edu/index.cfm?topic_id=1409&fuseaction=library.document&id=226)

## **2. April 3. The Armistice Regime: the Legal Foundations and the Issue of the Peace Regime**

The Korean war ended with an armistice. An ultimate objective shared by all parties to the conflict is to replace the armistice with a so-called “peace regime.” We consider the components of the armistice system and its decline in the 1990s. We also consider the issues associated with the UN and later Combined Forces Command (CFC) and the question of operational control (OPCON) of military forces on the peninsula.

- Lee Sanghee, “Toward a Peace Regime on the Korean Peninsula: A Way Forward for the ROK-US Alliance,” Brookings Institution, Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies, May 2007.
- Bruce Bechtol and Richard Bush, “Change of US-ROK Wartime Operational Command,” The Brookings Institution at [http://www.brookings.edu/articles/2006/0914southkorea\\_richard-c--bush-iii.aspx](http://www.brookings.edu/articles/2006/0914southkorea_richard-c--bush-iii.aspx)

## **3. April 8. The US-ROK Alliance: Early History**

Korea’s relationship with the United States has constituted a critical aspect of both its domestic politics and foreign policy since the division of the peninsula. We start with the early phases of the relationship up through the “Carter chill.” A central theme is the close relationship between external and internal politics: Park’s seizure of power in 1961; the Guam or Nixon doctrine and opening to China and the initiation of Yushin; and the Carter effort to withdraw forces and the rise of a US human rights agenda.

- Chae-jin Lee, *A Troubled Peace: US Policy and the Two Koreas* (Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006), Chapter Two (depending on your background, skim 9-37; focus particularly on 37-63) and Chapter Three, pp. 64-102 (you can skim material on Koreagate, 95-102).

## **4. April 10. The US responds to Kwangju**

The Kwangju uprising was a seminal event not only in recent Korean history, but also in the US alliance relationship; US response—or non-response—to the events generated strong reactions from members of the so-called “386 generation,” many of whom ultimately came to office under the Kim Dae Jung and particular Roh Moo Hyun administrations. Thanks to documents released through the efforts of Tim Shorrock, we have documentary insight into the decision-making around this important episode.

- James Fowler, “The United States and South Korean Democratization,” *Political Science Quarterly* 114, 2 (Summer 1999).

Recommended.

- William Gleysteen, *Massive Entanglement, Marginal Influence: Carter and Korea in Crisis* (Brookings, 1999), Chapter 9 and 10.
- Tim Shorrock, “The U.S. Role in Korea in 1979 and 1980” and other documents at [http://timshorrock.com/?page\\_id=21](http://timshorrock.com/?page_id=21). For additional English-language sources on Kwangju see Gusts of Popular Feeling at <http://populargusts.blogspot.com/2006/05/bibliography-of-kwangju-uprising-in.html>

### **5. April 15. What Were the North Koreans Thinking?**

Until recently, we have had little insight into what the North Korean regime was actually thinking about its relationship with the South during the Cold War. Thanks to the efforts of Kathryn Weathersby and the Cold War History Project, which has tapped the Soviet and other Warsaw Pact archives, we have a much better portrait. In particular, we are interested in the extent to which the North Korean leadership seriously contemplated reunification by force, and the views of the Soviet and Chinese leadership toward these ambitions.

- Kathryn Weathersby, “The Enigma of the North Korean Regime: Back to the Future?” Korea Economic Institute (2005).

## ***II. The Breakdown of the Cold War System***

### **6. April 17. Abandonment**

The end of the Cold War had profound political and economic implications for North Korea as first the Soviet Union shifted its stance toward the South, then collapsed, and China began to shift its views too. How did the South and North respond to these developments? We will also read two important North-South agreements from this period, which could serve as reference points in the development of a peace regime.

- Don Oberdorfer, *The Two Koreas*, Chapters 9, 10 and pp. 249-265.
- Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-aggression and Exchanges And Cooperation Between the South and the North, December 13, 1991
- Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, January 20, 1992 at <http://www.state.gov/t/ac/rls/or/2004/31011.htm>

## 7. April 22. The First Crisis

The first nuclear crisis of 1992-94 established the framework—literally, the Agreed Framework—for subsequent negotiations over security on the peninsula. These negotiations remain contested to this day. What generated the initial confrontation, and could it have been avoided? What were the core features of the Framework?

- Don Oberdorfer, *The Two Koreas*, Chapters 11, p. 265-end and Chapters 12-13.
- Leon V. Sigal, *Disarming Strangers: Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea* (Princeton University Press 1998), Appendix I (257-259); available from instructor.
- The Agreed Framework of October 21, 1994, available with other protocols and statements at [http://www.kedo.org/ap\\_main.asp](http://www.kedo.org/ap_main.asp)

Recommended.

The literature on the first crisis is large, with a few interesting new additions in the last two years.

- Michael J. Mazarr, *North Korea and the Bomb* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995).
- Leon V. Sigal, *Disarming Strangers: Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea* (Princeton University Press 1998). Important but still controversial defense of tit-for-tat strategy with North Korea; alternative views of North Korean bargaining behavior include Scott Snyder, *Negotiating on the Edge* (1999) and Chuck Downs, *Over the Line: North Korea's Negotiating Strategy* (1999).
- Joel S. Wit, Daniel Poneman and Robert Gallucci, *Going Critical: the First North Korean Nuclear Crisis* (Brookings 2004) and Marion Creekmore, *A Moment of Crisis: Jimmy Carter, The Power of a Peacemaker, and North Korea's Nuclear Ambitions* (Public Affairs 2006) are two more recent additions that provide insights from those directly involved in the negotiations.

The National Security Archive maintains a number of historical documents on the development of North Korea's nuclear capability at

<http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB87/#docs>

## 8. April 24. Implementation: the Politics of the Agreed Framework

The Agreed Framework remains controversial to this day. To its defenders, it constitutes a template for a cooperative solution to security problems on the peninsula, and an important reference point for the current Six Party Talks. To its detractors, however, it marked a form of nuclear blackmail with important weaknesses; these critics were vocal during the Clinton administration and set the tone for the management of North Korea under the first George W. Bush administration.

- Leon Sigal, “The North Korean Nuclear Crisis: Understanding the Failure of the Crime and Punishment’ Strategy, *Arms Control Today* (May 1997), at [http://www.armscontrol.org/act/1997\\_05/sigal.asp](http://www.armscontrol.org/act/1997_05/sigal.asp)
- Leon Sigal, “Negotiating an End to North Korea’s Missile-Making,” *Arms Control Today* (June 2000).
- Robert Hathaway and Jordon Tama, “The U.S. Congress and North Korea during the Clinton Years,” *Asian Survey* September-October 2004.

## 9. April 29. Famine in North Korea.

The first nuclear crisis overlapped with, and arguably contributed to, a complete unraveling of the North Korean economy. We consider the causes of the famine, including the political ones, and the implications of the famine for the long-run transformation of North Korea.

- Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland, *Famine in North Korea*, chs. 1 and 2 and Chapter 7, 171-195 on marketization and reform.

Recommended.

- For an earlier effort to integrate economic and security analysis, see Marcus Noland. *Avoiding the Apocalypse: the Future of the Two Koreas* (2000).
- An excellent source of press coverage of the North Korean economy can be found at North Korea Economy Watch at <http://www.nkeconwatch.com/>.

## 10. May 1. The New Political Order in the North.

The North Korean political system is opaque; as a result, there is substantial speculation about the nature of decision-making, which in turn colors political prescriptions toward the country. Is Kim Jong-Il in control? To what extent does he rely on the military, and to what effect? And what are the government’s intentions with respect to economic reform?

- Byung-Chul Koh, “Military-First Politics and Building a Powerful and Prosperous Nation in North Korea,” Nautilus Institute at <http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/0532AKoh.html>
- Robert Carlin and Joel S. Wit, *North Korean Reform: Politics, Economic, Security*. International Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Working Paper No. 382.

Recommended.

Serious research on North Korean politics is quite obviously limited, and some of the best work in English is done by Korean institutions with access to the intelligence community, particularly the Korean Institute for National Unification (KINU).

- Suh Dae-Sook, “Military-First Politics of Kim Jong Il,” *Asian Perspective* 26, 3 (2002): 145-167 provides a detailed analysis of some recent political changes.

### ***III. The Second Nuclear Crisis: the Players***

#### **11. May 6. The Crisis: An Overview and Markers in the Six Party Talks**

The remainder of the course will be devoted to a detailed consideration of the second nuclear crisis. We will begin with a simple factual overview and a consideration of the major setbacks and accomplishments: the September 2005 statement of principles and the February and October agreements.

- Chae-jin Lee, *A Troubled Peace*, pp. 223-256.
- Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks Beijing, September 19, 2005, <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2005/53490.htm>
- Initial Actions for Implementation of the Joint Statement, February 13, 2007. Annotated version in the Washington Post, Stephan Haggard and Susan Shirk at: <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/graphic/2007/02/17/GR2007021700188.html>
- Second-Phase Actions for the Implementation of the September 2005 Joint Statement, October 3, 2007 at <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2007/oct/93217.htm>

Recommended.

There have, of course, been a myriad of things written on various aspects of the crisis; this list is highly incomplete but tries to capture some of the contending analytic perspectives on the crisis.

- Victor D. Cha and David C. Kang, *Nuclear North Korea* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003) and Victor Cha and David C. Kang, “Can North Korea be Engaged? An Exchange,” *Survival* 46, 2 (Summer 2004) provide two contending views of engagement. Michael O’Hanlon and Mike Mochizuki, *Crisis on the Korean Peninsula* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2003) was an early statement of the case for a grand bargain.
- Selig Harrison, “Did North Korea Cheat?” *Foreign Affairs*, January-February 2005, and exchange between Mitchell Reiss and Robert Galucci and Harrison in *Foreign Affairs* March/April 2005. There is ongoing debate about the HEU program, and although there is no smoking gun in the public domain, the evidence from the Pakistani side seems to suggest that there were transfers that violated a number of North Korea’s commitments. See in particular the materials in Adrian Levy and Catherine Scott-Clark *Deception: Pakistan, the United States, and the Secret Trade in Nuclear Weapons* (2007).
- Daniel A. Pinkston and Phillip C. Saunders, “Seeing North Korea Clearly,” *Survival*, Vol. 45 (Fall 2003), pp. 79-102,

<<http://cns.miis.edu/research/korea/450079.pdf>>. Good analytic overview of bargaining problems in dealing with the North Koreans.

- Henry Rowen, “Kim Jong Il Must Go,” *Policy Review Online* at <http://www.policyreview.org/oct03/rowen.html>. Self-explanatory.
- Jack Pritchard, *Failed Diplomacy: The Tragic Story of How North Korea Got the Bomb* (Brookings, 2007). Critique of US strategy from insider.
- Yoichi Funabashi, *The Peninsula Question: A Chronicle of the Second Korean Nuclear Crisis* (Brookings, 2007). New account by leading Japanese journalist.
- Siegfried S. Hecker and William Liou, “Dangerous Dealings: North Korea’s Nuclear Capabilities and the Threat of Export to Iran,” *Arms Control Today*, March 2007, [http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2007\\_03/heckerliou.asp](http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2007_03/heckerliou.asp).
- Mitchell B. Reiss, “A Nuclear-armed North Korea: Accepting the ‘Unacceptable’?” *Survival*, Vol. 48, No. 4, Winter 2006-2007, pp. 97-110.

An important source on the history of the crisis is the website of the Center for Non-Proliferation Studies at <http://cns.miis.edu/research/korea/index.htm>

## **12. May 8. The Political Shift in South Korea: Kim Dae Jung’s Sunshine Policy**

The election of Kim Dae Jung was a watershed in South Korean politics. Although initially preoccupied with the Asian financial crisis, he articulated a vision of dealing with North-South relations that defined the Kim-Roh era: the concept of the Sunshine policy or engagement. What were the components and political challenges of the Sunshine approach?

- Norman D. Levin and Yong-Sup Han, *Sunshine in Korea: the South Korean Debate over Policies toward North Korea* (RAND, 2002), chs. 3 and 6.

## **13. May 13. The Roh Moo Hyun Extension**

The Roh Moo Hyun administration built on the core ideas of the Sunshine Policy but extended them in important and ultimately different ways. We will read both an outline of the Northeast Asian Cooperation Initiative, and an early critique.

- Presidential Committee on Northeast Asian Cooperation Initiative, *Toward a Peaceful and Prosperous Northeast Asia*.
- Choong Nam Kim, “The Roh Moo Hyun Government’s Policy Toward North Korea,” East-West Center Working Paper, August 2005.

## **14. May 15. American Preoccupations**

The election of George W. Bush and particularly the aftermath of 9/11 generated a political dynamic almost completely at odds with thinking in Seoul, particularly after the election of Roh Moo Hyun in 2002. The performance of the Bush administration with respect to the management of the crisis is, needless to say, politically contested.

- Michael Mazarr, “The Long Road to Pyongyang,” *Foreign Affairs* September/October 2007.
- Leon Sigal, “Letter: Asian Blunders,” *Foreign Affairs* January/February 2008 and Victor Cha and James Kelly “Pyongyang Blues” *Foreign Affairs* March/April 2008.

Recommended.

- John Bolton, *Surrender is Not an Option* (Threshold Editions, 2007), ch. 4.

### **15. May 20. The Alliance Issues**

The onset of the nuclear crisis overlapped with ongoing tensions within the US-Korea alliance and in some ways contributed to them. The US Department of Defense under Secretary Rumsfeld--and under the constraints of the Iraq war--were seeking to reposition forces globally. But this repositioning and different priorities under the Roh administration generated substantial tensions in the relationship.

- Chang-hee Nam, “Relocating the US Forces in South Korea,” *Asian Survey* July/August 2006.
- Bruce Bechtol, *Red Rogue: the Persistent Challenge of North Korea* (Potomac Books 2007), pp. 153-176.

### **16. May 22. China and Japan**

China and Japan are central players in the Six Party Talks, and their views have evolved, albeit it in very different directions during the course of the talks. Read one of the following pieces, depending on interest, and ask how the development of the talks themselves, as well as other domestic factors, has affected the two countries’ strategies.

- Christopher Hughes, “The Political Economy of Japanese Sanctions towards North Korea,” *Pacific Affairs*, Fall 2006.
- Bonnie Glaser, Scott Snyder and John Park, “Keeping an Eye on an Unruly Neighbor,” Center for Strategic and International Studies and US Institute of Peace, January 2008.

## ***IV. The Second Nuclear Crisis: Some Issues***

### **17. May 27. Economic Instruments: Does Engagement Work?**

A central question is whether engagement with North Korea since the beginning of the Sunshine policy has “worked,” and in what sense. The fact that the North Koreans tested nuclear weapons would seem to suggest that it did not, but this would be a false inference since a variety of other factors intervened, including US policy. We will approach this question through the lens of method: how would we know whether it had worked or not: how can we test the proposition?

- Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland, “North Korea’s External Economic Relations,” Peterson Institute for International Economics Working Paper 07-7, August 2007.
- Student presentations.

### **18. May 29. Sanctions and Constraints.**

Alternatively, we can ask the extent to which financial or other sorts of constraints on North Korea are likely to work, and again, meaning what exactly. Read either the piece tracing the history of the sanctions regime on North Korea or on the Proliferation Security Initiative.

- Congressional Research Service, *Proliferation Security Initiative: Update*, February 2008.
- Ruediger Frank, “The Political Economy of Sanctions Against North Korea,” *Asian Perspective*, Vol. 30, No. 3 (2006).
- Department of Treasury 31, *Finding That Banco Delta Asia S.A. Is a Financial Institution of Primary Money Laundering Concern*

Recommended.

- Julia Choi and Karin Lee, “North Korea: Economic Sanctions and U.S. Department of Treasury Actions, 1955-September 2006,” National Committee on North Korea, October 2006.

### **19. June 3. What Would a Nuclear Agreement Look Like?**

Striking a credible agreement hinges on the details; what is actually required to assure the parties? Is a verifiable agreement possible?

- David Albright and Paul Brannan, *Disabling DPRK Nuclear Facilities*. USIP Working Paper, October 2007.

Recommended. We are focusing primarily on the core nuclear issues, but there is of course the question of missiles.

- Daniel A. Pinkston, *The North Korean Ballistic Missile Program* (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, February 2008).

### **20. June 5. What Would a Broader Agreement Look Like? The Mechanism.**

Assuming the nuclear issue can be resolved, the question arises of what a more general agreement in the region would look like. This debate has begun over the idea advanced in the February Agreement about the creation of a Peace and Security

Mechanism. What would such a mechanism look like? The Atlantic Council proposal considers the entire range of issues; the Haggard and Noland piece looks at the economic dimension.

- The Atlantic Council, *A Framework for Peace and Security in Korea and Northeast Asia*. April 2007, 13-34.
- Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland, *A Security and Peace Mechanism for Northeast Asia: The Economic Dimension*. The Stanley Foundation, April 2008.